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The examination of U.S. crises reveals that the current financial crisis follows past patterns.  An 
investment bubble creates excess demand for new financing instruments.  During the railroad 
bubbles of the nineteenth century loans were issued at a pace higher than many companies could 
pay back.  The current housing bubble originated from issuing sub-prime mortgages that assume 
that housing prices would only rise.  The increased demand for credit induces financial 
innovations and instruments that circumvent existing regulations.  Inevitably, the bubble bursts.  
The history of financial crises teaches that policy reforms and new regulations cannot prevent 
future financial crises. 
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The Next Financial Crisis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The current financial crisis that originated in the United States of America has become a 
catalyst for global crises. What began as the bursting of a housing bubble in the United States, 
resulted in a major international financial crisis. How does this current period of economic chaos 
compare to the financial crises of the past?  By examining the major financial crises, the paper 
indicates commonalities among them.  Based on this analysis, one may answer the question as to 
whether the financial regulations proposed by the United States and other countries are 
appropriate for the current financial crisis. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a literature review.  Section III 
discusses the early United States banking panics in the 19
th century.  Section IV explores the 
crises of the 20
th century and compares them to those of the previous century.  Section V 
explains the causes and effects of the current financial crisis and compares them to previous 
financial crises.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II. LITERATURE  REVIEW 
The recent recession has stimulated renewed interest in the causes and effects of financial 
crises.  Many papers theorize various causes in hopes of finding a common pattern.  Bordo 
(2003) examines booms and busts in the United Kingdom and the United States.  He concludes 
that recessions originated in stock market crashes deepened only if there was already financial 
instability.  This conclusion is supported by the recessions prior to World War II in the United 
States, where recessions often involved both banking panics and financial distress.   3
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009A, 2009B) present evidence that these crises are not 
limited to the U.S.  They claim that any parallels drawn between crises in the United States can 
be applied to other countries.  Thus, the analysis of this paper, although dealing mainly with 
crises in the United States, is applicable to other countries. 
Klomp (2010) employs 132 banking crises across 110 countries since 1970 by use of a 
random coefficient model.   He concludes that credit growth, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth rate, and the real interest rate are on average the most important indicators of a banking 
crisis.  Yet, none of these variables is significant in more than 60 percent of the crises.  Klomp 
thus concludes that there is no common factor in causing crises. 
Garcia-Herrero and Del Rio (2003) use a sample of seventy-nine countries between 1970 
and 1999.  They find that when the objective of the central bank is price stability, the likelihood 
of a banking crisis is reduced.  Čihák (2007), utilizing a dynamic-panel model for the years 1985 
until 2005, shows that the more independent the central bank is, the more stable its financial 
institutions are.  Thus, the less politically constrained the Central Bank of a country is, the faster 
and more appropriate its actions are in preventing financial distresses. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Laeven and Valencia (2008) identify crises by 
determining if one of several situations occurs.  These situations include the ratio of non-
performing assets to total assets in the banking system exceeding ten percent, whether the cost of 
a government rescue operation is at least two percent of GDP, if the banking sector problems 
result in a nationalization of banks, or a large bank run takes place. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) conclude that crises are typically preceded by a multitude of 
weak and/or deteriorating economic fundamentals.  It is rare for speculative attacks to cause a   4
crisis when economic fundamentals are robust.  They conclude that banking crises often precede 
balance-of-payment misalignments, not necessarily exchange rate speculation.  Moreover, the 
evidence indicates that financial crises are significantly more severe when simultaneous banking 
and currency runs occur. 
Boyd, Nicolo, and Loukoianova (2010) question whether a “banking crisis” is actually a 
crisis in the banking system or just a response to government interventionist policies.  They use a 
simple model to derive consistent measures of bank systemic shocks, as in Boyd, 2010.  They 
show how the bank market structure, deposit insurance, external shocks and currency crises each 
affect systemic financial shocks and the government responses associated with them. 
 
III.  THE NINETEENTH CENTURY BANKING PANICS 
Up until the establishment of the Second Bank of the United States in 1816, the United 
States’ economy was most affected by changes in the European economies.  Therefore, 
international conflict was a primary source of economic instability.  Laws including the Embargo 
Act of 1807 caused great economic strife, but were mainly efforts to prevent America’s 
involvement in the Napoleonic wars.  The War of 1812 between the British and the United States 
adversely affected the United States economy, but in both of these cases, the roots of financial 
conflict were outside the bounds of financial regulation. 
This first financial crisis was the result of the United States’ interaction with speculation.  
Haulman, (2002) concludes that the U.S.  did not anticipate the decline in European demand for 
agriculture following the end of the Napoleonic wars.  In order to prevent Americans from 
purchasing land through credit and help landowners, President Monroe passed two bills   5
including the Land Act of 1820 and the Relief Act of 1821.  The panic ended after the passage of 
these Acts, in 1823. 
In 1837, widespread speculative fever led to a bank failure as President Andrew Jackson 
required payments to be in gold and silver rather than government issued currency.  Merely two 
years later, in 1839, a rise in international interest rates negatively influenced the already 
troubled economy and resulted in a depression, which lasted until 1843. 
The next major crisis was caused by the westward expansion of the United States and the 
advent of the railroad.  The burst of a railroad bubble led to several bank failures in the years 
following 1857.  The closure of banks, such as Ohio Life and Trust in New York City, was 
caused by speculation in western land and was accompanied with issues of embezzlement.  This 
closure resulted in a series of bank runs in New York City that extended outside of the city due 
to a drop in stock market prices.  This series of difficulties continued, resulting in the Panic in 
New York City on September 26, 1857.  Following this panic, banks were forced to suspend 
payment for two months to ease the situation. 
The next financial crisis, in the year 1873, was an extension of the previous crisis.  Another 
railroad bubble emerged, and eventually the railroads became over-extended and were unable to 
pay their debt obligations.  The failure of Jay Cooke & Co. on September 18
th, 1873 precipitated 
a stock market crash, which in turn caused a banking panic.  Banks suspended payments until 
November 1
st. 
As in many of the previous crises, an intense period of speculation preceded the Panic of 
1893.  This caused another railroad bubble.  This inevitably burst and resulted in the bankruptcy 
of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company.  A series of bank runs followed, which led   6
to more railroad and bank bankruptcies.  This panic was trailed by a drop in the national amount 
of gold due to over-productive silver mining, making gold relatively more valuable.  People 
traded their silver for gold until eventually the U.S.  banks reached their bottom limit for gold 
storage, leading to further bank panics. 
The first panic of the twentieth century, the Crisis of 1907, was similar to the crises of the 
preceding century.  It led to the creation of a central bank in the United States, the Federal 
Reserve.  The cause of this crisis was the failed attempt to corner United Copper Co. by F. 
Augustus Heinze, which led to the collapse of one of the major investment houses, the 
Knickerbocker Trust, and widespread bank runs.  During this panic, J.P. Morgan intervened and 
organized a group of bankers to inject liquidity into the New York Stock Exchange and New 
York City banks.  This act and the apparent vulnerability of the system encouraged the creation 
of the Federal Reserve. 
There were some distinctive features of the nineteenth-century crises including: the lack of 
a central bank, a commodity based currency, and a fragmented banking system.  The lack of a 
central bank made it extremely difficult to inject liquidity into the financial system in times of 
crisis.  Moreover, due to a commodity based standard the money supply could not increase, 
furthering the effects of the initial liquidity crisis.  In addition, the U.S. suffered from a 
fragmented banking system, mostly because of the prohibition on branch banking.  Even the term 
“banking” was narrowly defined, and led to unregulated financial intermediaries that were 
uncontrollable by the government.  Despite this problem existing for nearly two centuries, the 
government has been unable to resolve it and unregulated financial intermediaries remain a 
problem today.   7
Due to the lack of a central bank, the burden of increasing public confidence was left to 
private citizens such as J.P. Morgan.   These crises occurred when the economy was already in a 
strained state, and bubbles caused the economy to plummet.  In most of these cases, the bubble 
was in the railroad industry.  Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of each of these crises is that 
they started outside of the regulated financial sector.  This, as will be shown below, is similar to 
20
th and 21
st century crises. 
 
IV. THE  20
TH CENTURY CRISES 
The financial landscape of the twentieth century changed due to the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913, which created the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed).   The Fed experienced a period of initial 
success, with no banking panics between the years of 1915 and 1929.  Yet, the creation of the 
Federal Reserve created a moral hazard as financial intermediaries engaged in riskier financial 
behavior due to the increased financial protection the Fed provided. 
The first major crisis of the twentieth century was the Stock Market Crash of 1929.  This is 
one of the most significant and devastating periods in the history of the United States.  Because 
many banks invested the deposits of their customers into the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), Americans completely lost their life savings.  This drove the United States into the 
most severe recession it has ever experienced, known as the Great Depression.  It took twelve 
years for the United States to return to its previous potential Gross Domestic Product.  The Dow 
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) did not recover to its previous high of 381.17 until the year 
1954, twenty-five years after the crash.   8
The causes of the crash were similar to previous crises, but the consequences were very 
severe.  The crash was preceded by a speculative bubble, which was mostly driven by new 
technologies and industries, like the electronic and automotive industries.  This resulted in a 
period that was known as the “Roaring 20’s.”  The average Price to Earnings (P/E) ratio in 
September 1929 was at a high as 32.6 with 16 percent of U.S.  households investing in the stock 
market (Figure 1). This was a dramatic increase from prior years, and, represented potential 
widespread effects to the entire economy. 
Figure 1:Historical P/E Ratios 
 
 Source: McDuff (2006) 
The initial reaction of the government was to impose stricter regulation on the financial 
industry.  The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was the main regulation passed during this period.  In 
order to limit the scope of financial institutions, this act divided banks into separate categories 
including commercial banks, savings and loans associations, insurance companies, and 
investment banks, each with their own regulations.  This Act also created the Federal Deposit   9
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which insured consumers in case of bank runs.  The Act gave the 
government more instruments to intervene in financial markets during crises. 
After the passage of Glass-Steagall, there were no major crises until the 1985-1990 Savings 
and Loans (S&L) Crisis.  Following the Second World War, banks had very high liquidity and 
low-risk portfolios, which led to a lower bank failure rate.  However, in response to increased 
inflation and regulation, which limited the interest rates paid to depositors, and coupled with a 
portfolio that was aimed at the mortgage market, the U.S.  Congress deregulated the S&L 
institutions in 1980 and 1982 to improve the viability of these institutions.  As a result, the S&L 
institutions had many of the capabilities of commercial banks, without the associated regulations.  
This was a major factor in causing the 1985 crisis.  This pattern of regulation circumvention is 
going to repeat in future panics. 
The deregulation of the S&L Associations encouraged them to take additional risks, while 
still keeping depositors safe through deposit insurance.  This excessive risk was channeled into 
the real estate market.  As interest rates rose and confidence waned, house prices fell and 
numerous S&L institutions failed.  In response, the government eliminated anti-branch banking 
laws and repealed the restrictive Glass-Steagall Act.  Additionally, the insurance on deposits 
expanded, increasing the likelihood of risky behavior due to the government protection. 
The financial crises of the twentieth century shared some particular commonalities.  In the 
major crises, an investment boom was initiated by a new financial opportunity such as real 
estate, automobiles, or electronic technology.  This led to the inadequately regulated financial 
institutions to engage in risky ventures and created a speculative bubble.  This bubble later burst   10
and caused a financial crisis.  In all cases discussed thus far, a major factor in each financial 
downturn was the exploitation of unregulated financial institutions. 
 
V.  THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The current financial crisis is considered by many to be the worst downturn since the great 
depression.  The causes of this recent crisis are many, but the greatest factor was the housing 
bubble.  This dramatic decline in housing prices was unprecedented in its scale (see, S&P/Case 
Shiller Home Price Indices, 2010).  Figure 2 shows existing home sales and inventory before and 
after the bubble. 
This situation was exacerbated by the recent subprime mortgage trend.  Banks looked for a 
way to meet the high demand for mortgages through the creation of newly-designed and vaguely 
understood financial instruments, such as CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations) and MBSs 
(Mortgage Backed Securities).  CDOs provided a way to spread risk away from the original 
securities so that the banks providing sub-prime mortgages became disassociated with the risk 
they created.  These unregulated securities were often based on subprime mortgages.  Figure 3 
displays the steady increase in the issuance of mortgage backed securities and the dramatic drop 
following the burst of the housing bubble as people could no longer afford to pay their 
mortgages.  Out of the eighty-million houses in the U.S., about fifty-five million had mortgages.  
Of those fifty-five million, four million were actually behind on their payments.  In 2007, 
foreclosure proceedings began for about 1.5 million homes, which represented an increase of 
fifty percent from 2006. 
   11
Figure 2: Existing Home Sales and Inventory 
 
Source: Iacono (2008) 
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Figure 3: US Issues of Non-Agency MBS ($billion) 
 
Source: Twiggs (2008) 
Figure 4: Homeowners With Zero or Negative Equity 
 
              Source: Equifax, Moody’s Economy.com   13
The United States has unique policies over renting and owning.  On the one hand, when 
renting a home, a landlord has the right to evict the tenant with five-day notice if his rent 
payments are late.  On the other hand, for mortgages, the bank must foreclose on the house and 
be issued a court order before the tenant can be evicted.  However, there is another option for the 
tenant.  A mortgage is based off of the value of a house at the time of purchase.  Therefore, if the 
price of a house drops below the value of the mortgage, then the owner will be paying for a 
mortgage that costs more than the house is worth.  In this case, the owner can walk away from 
this obligation with limited direct ramifications as most mortgages in the United States are non-
recourse, meaning the banks cannot seize your other assets in order to repay your loan.  It is thus 
no wonder that many preferred just to give the keys to their houses to the bank and walk away 
from their mortgage burden.  Figure 4 illustrates the increase in homeowners with zero or 
negative equity in recent years. 
Additionally during the bubble, the United States had a large trade deficit.  This large 
deficit meant that vast sums of foreign funds were invested in the United States.  When the crisis 
occurred, the money invested by foreign firms and governments, such as China and Russia, was 
lost, adversely affecting these companies.  As these firms were forced to take losses, the crisis 
spread to other countries.  In addition, due to the involvement of foreign government in financing 
the U.S. debt, it limited the possibility of not bailing out these highly indebt big financial 
institutions.  Moreover, it is estimated that forty percent of total U.S. Bank assets were in 
“Shadow Banking,” or non-bank lending institutions that were not federally controlled (Geithner 
2010).  This explains the extent of the bubble as financial institutions attempted to seek small 
spreads with significantly increased risk.  Without transparency, including the off-balance sheet   14
activities of banks, people could not make well informed investment decisions and many lost 
substantial amounts of money. 
  The collapse of Bear Stearns on August 1, 2008 marks the turning point from the burst of a 
housing bubble to a widespread financial crisis.  Bear Stearns was one of the largest holders of 
mortgage backed securities.  Although the company had enough capital to cover the losses it 
incurred, investors became less confident in the company and a bank run occurred.  This led to a 
precipitous drop in its stock price as shareholders rushed to sell their shares.  The Federal 
Reserve Bank helped J.P. Morgan Chase to purchase this company during the weekend of March 
24, 2008.  The initial acquisition price was 2 dollars per share.  This price increased to 10 dollars 
a share within a week in an attempt to appease the shareholders and allow the deal to be 
finalized.  Confidence in the market was not restored, and soon other holders of mortgage-
backed securities began to fail. 
  The widespread decline in the financial services sector led to decreases in employment, 
particularly in other service sectors.  The decline adversely affected other industries including the 
durable goods sector, which is highly sensitive to the availability of credit.  It also impacted the 
non-durable goods as many heavily indebted consumers lost their jobs.  By October 2009, the 
unemployment rate rose to 10.1%.  The entire value of home equity in the United States dropped 
from $13.3 trillion to $8 trillion, a loss of $5.3 trillion.  Investment assets lost $3.5 trillion.  
Compared to the current United States GDP of $14.26 trillion this is a massive amount of wealth 
destruction. 
  Despite the complexity of the recent crisis, the similarities with previous episodes are 
apparent.  In all cases, the crisis followed a bubble.  In each case, the difficulties originated in   15
lightly regulated financial institutions and instruments.  These financial crises affected other 
sectors of the economy as credit became scarce.  The stock market crash of 1929 led to an 
overall drop in the industrial sector.  Similarly, the current recession with its credit crunch forced 
car companies like General Motors and Chrysler into prearranged bankruptcies where severe 
restructuring was only avoided by government assistance. 
  The United States reacted more aggressively than in previous crises.  First, President 
George W. Bush signed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on October 3, 2008.  This 
program attempted to allow the Fed and Treasury to purchase troubled assets from financial 
institutions in order to increase confidence in the financial sector.  However, this program was 
not successful, and instead became a recapitalization of banks, such as Goldman Sachs and 
Citigroup as well as other large troubled companies, for example GM and Chrysler.  Under the 
Obama Administration, which took office in January 2009, the government approved an 
additional $787 billion stimulus package.  Moreover, the Federal Reserve dramatically expanded 
the monetary base through lowering the Federal Funds Rate and quantitative easing, expanding 
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. 
  While the government handed billions of dollars to various companies, it recently passed 
the Dodd-Frank Regulatory Reform Bill.  Table 1 provides details of the U.S. reforms.  This bill 
establishes a new body that will protect consumers, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  
This Bureau will have the power to create rules for any financial entity, including banks, 
nonbanks, and credit unions with assets of $10 billion.  This bill gives the United States 
government more control during periods of impending crises, an important step considering the 
causes of the most recent crisis (Delaney and Nasiripour, 2010).  Paul Volcker, former Federal   16
Reserve Chairman and the current chair of Barack Obama's Economic Recovery Advisory Board 
also proposed that banks should be restricted in making speculative decisions using taxpayer-
backed money (Appelbaum and Cho, 2010).  This proposal was signed into law by President 
Obama on July 21, 2010. 
 
Table 1: Regulation Changes for United States of America 
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Source: New York Times online (Herszenhorn 2010)   17
Given the expansionary monetary policy and the dramatic increase in government debt, the 
specter of previous high inflation has reemerged.  Meanwhile, Central Bank officials maintain 
that they will be able to raise interest rates and drain liquidity from the system as the economy 
recovers to avoid inflation. 
The U.S. financial crisis has had significant global consequences.  This makes the global 
response to this financial crisis even more important.  The importance of global cooperation is 
illustrated in the following scenario.  Assume that two countries have the same level of banking 
regulations.  There is no advantage to using the banks of one country versus the other.  Now 
assume that one country becomes more lenient in their regulations, this country would 
experience an influx of investors.  This leads to regulatory arbitrage, where capital seeks the less 
restrictive regime.  As one country becomes more lenient, the other country is forced to respond 
potentially leading to a destructive “race to the bottom” where regulations are minimized in order 
to attract investment.  Thus, the importance of global cooperation cannot be exaggerated.   This 
global cooperation is not going to be metalized anytime soon, because of narrow national 
interest.  Thus, the conclusion is that financial crises are here to stay and another bubble will 
burst in the future.  The only question is when. 
The Group of 30 Report (2009) entitled “Financial Reform – A Framework for Financial 
Stability” calls for the reform of the world financial markets in the following areas.  Financial 
supervision, its quality and effectiveness need to be globally coordinated and improved.   
Transparency of financial intermediaries needs to increase.  Capital requirements need to 
increase taking into account the possibility of catastrophes.  Better monitoring of large 
institutions and their risk portfolios are required.  These reforms, the Report asserts, will require   18
several years to be implemented due to the complexities of each countries political system.   
Based on the past experiences, these well-intended global financial reforms will be difficult to 
actually implement. 
Despite this call for cooperation, each country needs to implement its own reforms due to 
different constraints each faces.  However, a system for regulating the global financial market 
needs to be created as well to prevent rash policymaking within individual countries. 
While the current crisis is certainly affecting many of the developed economies, the effects 
on emerging markets are varied.  Table 2 overviews The World economic outlook projections for 
selected countries.  How these emerging economies behave could determine their place in the 
future, post-recession economy.  Emerging markets have a unique vulnerability to crises 
originated in the developed economies because emerging markets depend on these economies in 




The examination of many U.S. crises reveals that the current financial crisis follows past 
patterns.  In almost every case, an investment bubble creates excess demand for new financing 
instruments.  The railroad bubble saw loans being issued at a rate higher than any company could 
pay back, while the current housing bubble results in sub-prime mortgages issued that relied on 
the unrealistic assumption that value of housing would continue to rise.  Following this trend, the 
demand for credit is met by financial innovations that tend to skirt regulations.  Inevitably, the   19
bubble bursts, and these unregulated financial institutions leads to bankruptcies, bank failures, 
and an economic recession. 
It is difficult to determine who is to blame for such a catastrophe.  Should the blame rest 
with the home buyers, the mortgage lenders, the commercial banks marketing securities, the 
investment banks, the investors purchasing these securities, the inattentive regulators, the 
historically low interest rates, government policies, or the academic economic community? The 
message of this article is that we are all at fault.  The implication of this last sentence is that 
financial crises will continue to be a part of the capitalist economy.  New regulations would help, 
but only in avoiding past crises.  Once new regulations are enacted, stakeholders respond by 
inventing ways to circumvent them.  Anyone who claims that he is smart enough to design a 
better regulatory system that will prevent future crises is underestimating the ingenuity of a 
human acting to increase their personal well-being.  Of course, we can do better next time, but 
there are enough forces within the current system that will guarantee that regulations can and 
will be circumvented. 
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Table 2: Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections for Selected Countries 
 (Percent Change) 
  Projections  Difference from January 
2010 WEO projections 
  2008  2009  2010  2011  2010  20011 
World Output  3.0  -.6  4.2  4.3  .3  0.0 
Advanced Economies  .5  -3.2  2.3  2.4  .2  0.0 
U.S.  .4  -2.4  3.1  2.6  .4  .2 
Euro Area  .6  -4.1  1.0  1.5  0.0  .1 
Germany  1.2  -5.0  1.2  1.7  -.3  -.2 
United Kingdom  .5  -4.9  1.3  2.5  0.0  -.2 
Emerging and Developing 
Economies 
6.1  2.4  6.3  6.5  .3  .2 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
3.0  -3.7  2.8  3.4  .8  -.3 
China  9.6  8.7  10.0  9.9  0.0  0.2 
India  7.3  5.7  8.8  8.4  1.1  .6 
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